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Brittain: Navigation Servitude - The Shifting Rule of No Compensation

COMMENTS
NAVIGATION SERVITUDE - THE SHIFTING
RULE OF NO COMPENSATION*

I.

THE SETTING

Water, like other natural resources, generally derives its
value from the uses to which it can be put. The value can
come from the use of the water itself, such as irrigation, or
from an increased use of land that abuts a body of water,
such as a port site. In either case, part of the land's value,
and perhaps its sole value, is due to the use of or access to the
water. At times, however, the individual water user may find
that the federal government has decided to assert a superior
right over the water, ultimately impairing use of the water
and decreasing the land's value. Although this superior right
may take many forms,' one form frequently employed is the
navigation servitude.
The navigation servitude rests on the principle that
any property right dependent for its exercise or value
on the presence of navigable waters is subject to a
defect of title, called a servitude, and the federal government exercising both its superior power over
navigable waters and the servitude may take, destroy or impair the property without payment of
compensation.2
The rule,' therefore, consists of two concepts: first, that the
federal government has a superior power' over the control of
*This comment was financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of the
University of Wyoming.
1. For example, the Government may assert superior rights in the water
through the infamous reservation doctrine or the Reclamation Act. See
TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS (Na-

tional Water Comm. PB 203600 1971).
2. Id. at 175. Professor Morreale was even more succinct when she styled
the navigation servitude as a "rule that in the exercise of the navigation
power certain private property may be taken without compensation."
Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and
the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 19 (1963).
3. The reader should not be deceived by what may appear to be a simple rule.
Nonetheless, its basic treatment at this point should suffice. For very
thorough treatments of the navigation servitude see Morreale, Federal
Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No
Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 (1963); Bartke, The Navigation
Servitude and Just Compensation-Strugglefor a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REV.
1 (1968); Munro, The Navigation Servitude and the Severance Doctrine, 6
LAND & WATER L. REV. 491 (1971).
4. The nature and extent of this so-called power has itself become the subject
of considerable debate. On the one hand, it is said that the power is derived
Copyright@ 1972 by the University of Wyoming
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navigable waters; second, that no compensation will be paid
for injury to property when the right is exercised.' The first
concept is generally thought necessary to the proper development of water resources.' "[T]he historic right of the public
to passage on navigable waters, free from obstruction or
monopolization of owners of the beds or riparian lands"' is
more than adequate justification for giving the federal government a navigation servitude over certain waters. The no
compensation concept, however, has evoked extensive criticism
as being inherently unjust and economically unsound.'
As originally formulated, the no compensation rule may
have appeared to be the reasonable consequence of the Government's limited right over navigable waters. For one thing,
it seemed evident that the navigation servitude would apply
only to those waters deemed publicly navigable, a term originally defined quite narrowly.' In addition, the rule of the
navigation servitude had its historical basis in a public right
to a free and unhindered passage in navigable waters.1" Therefore, the rule implicitly indicated that it applied only to those

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

from the commerce clause. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824); Morreale, supra note 3, at 3. On the other hand, some writers
have argued that
[t]he incidents of the federal interest have been developed to the
point where its proprietary character is quite clear and that, therefore, the continued attempts to deal with it solely under the commerce clause are both unnecessary and misleading. The interest
should be recognized for what it is and be dealt with in the context of the property clause of the Constitution.
Bartke, supra note 3, at 2. See also Munro, supra note 3.
The no compensation rule is not unique to federal water law, nor to the
treatment of governmental powers over natural resources in general. Consider, for example, the no compensation rule employed when the Government deprives an individual of his water right under the reservation doctrine, or the fact that no compensation will be paid when the Government
revokes a grazing permit under the Taylor Grazing Act. TRELEASE, supra
note 1, at 104-74; Ragsdale, Section 8 Rights Under the Taylor Grazing Act,
4 LAND & WATER L. REV. 399 (1969).
Martz, The Role of the Federal Government in State Water Law, 5 KAN.
L. REV. 626 (1957).
TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 274.
See generally Morreale, supra note 3; TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 181-85;
Note, The Public Right of Navigation and the Rule of No Compensation,
44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 236 (1968). But see Bartke, supra note 3; Munro,
supra note 3.
For example, in 1870 the Supreme Court said: "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
Morreale, supra note 3, at 25-31.
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Government projects directly aimed at furthering this free
and unhindered passage. The cases arising at this time factually lent credence to these principles. For example, Gibson
v. United States," an 1896 Supreme Court case, involved a
Government-built dike in the Ohio River. The purpose of the
dike was to concentrate the water's flow so as to improve the
river's navigability. The dike, however, caused an island
farm to be cut off from the flow of the river. The owner of
the island claimed a loss in value to the land caused by its
inaccessibility to the water. The Court rejected the claim,
stating that "riparian ownership is subject to the obligation
to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation
in the exercise of the dominant right of the Government in
that regard." 2 It should be noted, however, that evidence had
been introduced to show that the landowner still had access
to the water by wagon. It could be argued, therefore, that the
landowner had suffered no more than inconvenience, while
the public as a whole gained a more navigable waterway. In
addition, the Ohio River dike was not touching the island,
nor did it cause any water to flow on the land. Finally, the
dike was obviously intended to aid in the navigability of a
navigable river.
From these limited beginnings, the navigation servitude has
experienced considerable growth, carrying with it the rule of
no compensation. Those waters deemed navigable came to conceivably encompass most of the waters in the United States,"
including those waters that are (1) navigable in fact;"4 (2)
were navigable at one time;" (3) could be made navigable
11. 166 U.S. 269 (1896).
12. Id. at 276.
13. As laconically stated by one writer: "It has been suggested that the contemporary test [of navigability] may be whether a stream is navigable
enough to float a Supreme Court opinion." Corker, The Western Water
Rights Settlement Bill of 1957, in LEGAL PROBLEMS IN WATER RESOURCES

48 (Grahm ed. 1957).

For more extensive discussions of the judicial criteria

of navigability see Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private
Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391, 398-432 (1970);

Morreale, supra note 3, at 2-8; Silverstein, The Legal Concept of Navigability v. Navigability in Fact, 19 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 49 (1946).
14. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
15. See Economy Power & Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921) in
which the Court found waters to be navigable on the basis of commercial use
for early American fur trading.
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by reasonable improvements;"0 or (4) are non-navigable
streams that may have an impact on a navigable waterway. 7
There was also considerable weakening of the idea that
the navigation servitude applied only to those projects aimed
at promoting the public's right to a free and unhindered
passage on navigable waters. It has been established that improvements of navigation can be found in such diverse projects as dams for flood control or watershed development,"
power generation, 9 or even the use of riparian lands for
profitable commercial ventures." Furthermore, the improvement of navigation need not be the main objective of a governmental project.2 1 These much diminished requirements
for the operation of the navigation servitude led one writer
to conclude:
The rule that evolves.., supports federal projects in
the name of the navigation power for non-navigation
purposes. The origin of the power still demands that
one purpose be the protection or the improvement
of navigation. But once that requirement has been
complied with, Congress may in effect use the waters
of both navigable and non-navigable streams for
whatever purposes it wishes.22
Finally, the decisions indicate that a determination of
navigability or whether a project is motivated by improvements to navigation is a matter for Congress to determine.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 877 (1940).
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., supra note 16.
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). The land involved in this
case was a port site, taken from its owner at a reduced value and ultimately leased to Boeing Aircraft for commercial use. It should be pointed
out, however, that the taking involved a larger flood control project on
the Columbia River. Hence, an exercise of the dominant navigation servitude solely for the benefit of private interests may not be an appropriate
exercise of the power. Prior to the Rands decision, the Supreme Court had
stated: "We need not ponder whether by virtue of a highly fictional
navigational purpose the Government could destroy the flow of a navigable
stream and carry away its waters for sale to private interests without compensation to those deprived of them. We have never held that or anything
like it." United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950).
Despite this language, the Rands decision seems to indicate that private
interests may indeed benefit from the exercise of the power of navigation
servitude. See TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 186.
21. Oklahoma ex rel, Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
22. Morreale, supra note 3, at 11.
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In United States v. Twin City Power Co.,2" the Supreme Court
stated:
It is not for the courts, however, to substitute their
judgments for congressional decisions on what is or
is not necessary for the improvement or protection of
navigation ....

The decision of Congress that this

project will serve the interests of navigation involves engineering and policy considerations for
Congress and Congress alone to evaluate. 2
For all practical purposes, therefore, it would appear that
Congress determines whether the power of the navigation
servitude will be exercised. 5
As the number of projects and types of streams covered
by the servitude grew, so did the number of non-compensable
losses. While there was little quarrel with the United States'
superior power over navigable waters, it seemed illogical to
conclude that every exercise of that power should go uncompensated. "[T]he Supreme Court seems to have confused or
identified the national power over navigable waters with the
non-compensability features of the servitude.""
The general theory of the no compensation rule appeared
to be that private ownership of running water of a navigable
stream is inconceivable, i.e., one cannot be paid for something
he does not own." Hence, compensation was denied individuals for loss of their riparian access,2" loss of the use of
23. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
24. Id. at 224.
25. On one occasion, however, the*Supreme Court did indicate that not all
Governmental claims to its power of the navigation servitude would be
upheld. In United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950),
the Court held a Governmental project to come under the Reclamation Act,
thereby requiring compensation for the taking of water rights. See note
20 supra. Note, however, that the declaration in Twin City occurred six
years after the Gerlach decision.
26. TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 176. See also Morreale, supra note 3, at 21.
27. In United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. the Court said:
"Ownership of a private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is
conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable stream is
capable of private ownership is inconceivable." 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1915). In
a somewhat more articulate manner, one writer phrased the theory this
way: "Since the navigation servitude is owned by the federal government,
any use of the government, or its licensee, need not be compensated, for the
obvious reason that the government should not be compelled to pay for
what it already owns." Munro, supra note 3, at 495.
28. Gibson v. United States, supra note 11; United States v. Commodore Park,
Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1944).
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stream beds,29 and the loss of obstructing structures.8 0 All
these losses, however, were restricted to the water itself,
thereby giving the impressions that the navigation servitude
does not extend beyond the bed of a navigable stream.'
What result would obtain, then, if the Government
uses the navigation servitude to deny compensation for a
taking of property having a special value in the use of or
access to navigable water? 2 For example, will land ideally
suited as a boat launch on a navigable stream be valued with
or without its special use when taken under the United States'
exercise of the navigation servitude ? Clearly any property
taken will be compensable within the meaning of the fifth
amendment." The issue is the valuation of that property
taken. Strictly speaking, therefore, the navigation servitude
in this context involves lessened compensation rather than
no compensation.
Although the issue of compensation for property dependent for its value on navigable water was raised as early
as 1893," 4 it was not settled until 1956. In United States v.
Twin City Power Co., a hydroelectric company desired to
generate power through the use of the navigable Savannah
River. In order to effectuate this project, the power company
purchased land on both sides of the river in an area particularly suitable for constructing a hydroelectric dam. Permission was given by the United States for the power company
to proceed with the project. However, prior to actual con29. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913). This paricular
case involved the denial of compensation for the destruction of oyster beds
by the United States. While destruction of oyster beds is now made compensable by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1497 (1970), the power of the United
States over the bed of navigable waters remains intact. See United States
v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., supra note 27.
30. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Louisville Bridge
Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1916).
31. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950.) Technically
it is still true that the navigation servitude is confined to the bed of a
stream. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that the servitude affects lands surrounding the stream as well, since the servitude determines the amount of
compensation that will be paid for the lands if taken in an exercise of the
power. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
32. "Navigable water" is used loosely here to include the non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams. For reasons to be developed later, the distinction may be important.
33. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
34. Mongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
35. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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struction of the project, the United States decided to take
the power company's land as part of a larger water project.
In determining the amount of compensation due, the United
States discounted any value of the land as a site for hydroelectric power operations. The power company was offered
about one hundred and fifty thousand dollars as compensation
for the land based on its use for timber and farming. The
power company had shown, however, that the land's worth as a
power project site was about $1.25 million. The Supreme
Court upheld the Government's method of valuation, stating:
"The landowner here seeks a value in the flow of the stream,
a value that inheres in the government's servitude and one
the government can grant or withthat under our decisions
36
chooses."
it
hold as
Several years later the issue again came before the Supreme Court. In United States v. Rands," the land taken
bordered on the navigable Columbia River in Oregon. Although the land had some value for its agricultural uses and
sand and gravel deposits, its chief worth was as a port site.
In fact, the state of Oregon had an option to purchase the
land as a port site. When a federal dam flooded part of the
land, the United States condemned the entire parcel. The
landowner sought the option price as compensation for the
taking. The Court, however, awarded compensation based on
the land's non-riparian value, an amount equal to about onefifth of its port site worth. In so holding, the Court reiterated
its position taken in Twin City" that there will be no compensation for a value dependent upon the presence of water. The
Rands decision, therefore, dashed the hopes of those who
might have felt that Twin City was a decision limited to its
facts.
Not all formulations of the no compensation rule took
place in the Supreme Court. In 1918, Congress passed a law
which formulated its own version: when a partial taking of
land occurs and some property remains adjacent to the
stream, any special benefits accruing to the property because
36. Id. at 225.
37. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
88. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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of its access to or use of the waterway will be deducted from
the compensation paid. 9 The following example is illustrative of this congressional rule. A has a 40 acre tract of land
bordering on a navigable stream. That portion of the tract
bordering on the water, 20 acres, is valuable as an industrial
port site. The United States condemns the one-half of A's
tract that borders the stream in order to construct a dam and
submerge the land. A non-riparian 20 acre tract has a fair
market value of $10,000, while the fair market value of a
riparian industrial port site is worth $20,000. Under the no
compensation rule, A will receive $10,000 for the 20 acres
taken since the additional $10,000 results from a value in the
water. However, the 20 acres not condemned that was formerly non-riparian will become riparian once the project is
completed, thereby gaining access to the water by virtue of
the project and once again becoming valuable as an industrial
port site. Therefore, the project has caused A's remaining 20
acres to gain an additional $10,000 in value to be deducted
from the original $10,000 compensation, leaving A with onehalf of the land he originally owned and no compensation for
the land taken. Although the illustration may appear extreme, one need only look at the Rands decision to realize the
very real possibility of its occurrence."
From the courts and Congress, therefore, the navigation
servitude had become a formidable means of allowing the
United States to escape payment of compensation. The rule,
however, had its detractors,4 1 and the manifest injustice of
the Rands decision made it increasingly apparent that changes
would have to be made.

I. THE

SHIFTING RULE OF No COMPENSATION

The no compensation aspect of the navigation servitude
has never been completely immune from change. At one time
or another, all three branches of the federal government have
made modifications of the servitude's noncompensable fea39. 33 U.S.C. § 595 (1970).
40. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
41. See generally Morreale, supra note 3.
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tures4 2 However, there had never been any sweeping reforms
in the law until 1970.
On December 31, 1970, Congress quietly passed into law
Section 111 of the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Act
of 1970.4 Despite the lack of fanfare, Section 111 has created
a significant shift in the navigation servitude's rule of no
compensation. It is the intent of this comment to examine the
nature and extent of that change.
In pertinent part, Section 111 provides:
In all cases where real property shall be taken
by the United States for the public use in connection
with any improvements of rivers, harbors, canals,
or waterways of the United States, and in all condemnation proceedings by the United States to acquire
lands or easements for such improvements, the compensation to be paid for real property taken by the
United States above the normal high water mark
of navigable waters of the United States shall be the
fair market value of such real property based upon
all uses to which such real property may reasonably
be put, including its highest and best use, any of which
uses may be dependent upon access to or utilization
of such navigable waters.
In cases of partial takings of real property, no
depreciation in the value of any remaining real property shall be recognized and no compensation shall be
paid for any damages to such remaining real property which result from loss of or reduction of access
from such remaining real property to such navigable
waters because of the taking of real property or the
purposes for which such real property is taken.
This analysis of Section 111 will be in four parts: (A)
the legislative history of Section 111; (B) an analysis of
Section 111 from the standpoint of legislative materials; (C)
a discussion of the terminology of Section 111; (D) an analysis of case law which might now be altered by Section 111.
42. TRETLASE, supra note 1, at 186-89.
43. Section 111 is now codified in 33 U.S.C. § 595(a)
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A. Legislative History of Section 111
The first bill 44 concerning compensation for the taking

of land abutting navigable waters was introduced on June 24,
1969, in the House of Representatives.4 5 The bill quickly died
in the House Public Works Committee. Almost a year later,
May 6, 1970, identical bills were introduced into the House
and the Senate. Both bills" were sent to committees on public works. After hearings,47 the bills died in their respective
committees.
The bill that was ultimately to become Section 111 was
introduced into the House of Representatives on December 3,
1970. There were no hearings on the bill, although there was
some brief discussion of it in a House Public Works Committee Report." On December 7, 1970, the bill was passed by
the House and sent to the Senate.
44. This was not the first proposal for legislative change. As early as 1967,
the American Bar Association's Committee on Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law had recommended changes in the navigation servitude as it
affects landfill areas that border on navigable waters. ABA SUBCOMM. ON
NAVIGATION SERVITUDE, The Navigation Servitude, 2 REAL PROP., PROBATE &
TRUST J. 597 (1967). The ABA's efforts, however, were never really
directed at a law such as section 111. In fact, it is the opinion of the ABA
Subcommittee on Navigation Servitude that section 111 is an inadequate reformation of the navigation servitude. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON NAVIGATION SERVITUDE, Federal Navigation Servitude, 6 REAL PROP., PROBATE
& TRUST J. 132-33 (1971). As the Subcommittee's chairman, Eugene Morris,
indicated in a recent law review article: "Although the servitude has been

repeatedly sustained by the United States Supreme Court-indeed even
expanded by the Court in some of its recent decisions-this does not alter
the fact that there is a pressing need for reexamination of that doctrine in
light of its debilitating effect upon the utilization of our waterfront areas
in a manner which is consistent with the existing requirements of our
modern urban society." Morris The Federal Navigation Servitude: Impediment to the Development of the Waterfront, 45 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 189,
199 (1970). It is very likely, therefore, that the ABA will continue to
press for additional change of the navigation servitude. For additional
comments by the ABA on this matter see ABA REPORT OF THE COMM. ON
PUBLIC REGULATION OF LAND USE, 3 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J.

256

(1968); ABA COMM. ON PUBLIC REGULATION OF LAND USE, FederalNavigation Servitude, 4 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 38E (1969).
45. H.R. 12383, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The full text of the bill is reprinted in Appendix A.
46. S. 3815, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 17505, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
The bill is reprinted in Appendix B.
47. Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Flood Control-Rivers and
Harbors of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 677-711
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 17505
Before the Subcomm, on Rivers and Harbors and the Subcomm. on Flood
Control of the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 153-73,
210-218 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. For a closely related discussion see Senate Hearings 187-205.
48. H.R. 19877, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
49. H.R.REP. No. 91-1665, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1970).
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The Senate, however, rejected the House Bill and substituted its own version of a method to change the navigation servitude." As in the House, only a committee report
accompanied the Senate Bill.5' The Senate approved their
version of the law on December 9, 1970.
Since the House and Senate bills differed, the matter
went into conference. On December 17, 1970, a Conference
Report was presented to the House,52 with the original House
Bill once again replacing the Senate version. No reason was
given for this change. Finally, on December 31, 1970, the bill
was passed and became what is now Section 111.
B. Legislative Analysis of Section 111
From a legislative history viewpoint, three methods of
analysis should provide some insight into the scope and meaning of Section 111: (1) congressional hearings; (2) committee
reports; (3) comparison and contrast of Section 111 and the
bills which preceded it.
1. Hearings
Testimony and prepared statements presented before the
congressional comimttees do not contribute much to an understanding of Section 111.'s Most information given at the hearings did not come from the legislators themselves but from
interested outside parties. The two individuals who gave
lengthy statements in favor of changing the no compensation
rule were also representing parties who had lost or stood to
lose significant amounts of money under the old law." This
is not to impute any prejudice on their part, but it is certainly
50. S. 4572, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 109 (1970). The full text of this bill is reprinted in Appendix C.
51. S. REP. No. 91-1422, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970).
52. H.R. REP. No. 91-1782, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1970).
53. See Senate Hearings and House Hearings, supra note 47.
54. These individuals were Harold R. DeMoss Jr., an attorney from Houston,
representing a group of people whose land was condemned by a federal flood
control project, and Robert Sylvia, a Boston attorney, whose law firm had
represented an individual who fell victim to the navigation servitude's no
compensation rule. The testimony and prepared statements of Mr. DeMoss
are in House Hearings, supra note 47, at 153-57; Senate Hearings, supra
note 47, at 677-99.
Mr. Sylvia's comments and a prepared statement are
in Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 699-707.
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a factor to be aware of in considering their statements. The
only individual who testified against any changes in the laws
of navigation servitude did so on behalf of the Department
of the Army, the governmental branch that benefits the most
from paying reduced prices for riparian land.55
It should also be noted that these hearings related to proposed bills which were somewhat different than Section 111.
There were never any hearings on Section 111. While the
precise differences between these bills and Section 111 will
be discussed in detail later, the reader should be aware now
that the hearings were not directed at Section 111 as enacted."
Nevertheless, the hearings in both the House and the
Senate did make several points worth noting. First, it was
indicated several times that the Government's paramount
right to take land and structures below the normal high water
mark would not be affected by the proposed changes in the
law." Although this same point is expressly stated in Section
111, its repetition in the hearings serves as emphasis on the
limits of the new law. Basically this means that the changes
brought about by Section 111 only affect the amount of compensation to be paid, not the navigation servitude itself or the
rule of no compensation as it applies to a stream or its bed.
One of the dominant feelings expressed at these hearings
was that United States v. Rands"5 was inherently unjust and
must be legislatively overruled. This was the thrust of most
comments made before the committees. As Loney Hart of the
Department of the Army phrased it: "The apparent objective of this bill (H.R. 17505) is to overcome the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Rands." 9 Senator John
Tower of Texas, a sponsor of a predecessor to Section 111,
expressed much this same idea.6" On the basis of this testimony on similar bills, one might argue that Section 111 has a
55. The individual testifying was Loney W. Hart, Real Estate Directorate Office, Chief of Engineers, Dep't of the Army. Mr. Hart's testimony is in
House Hearings, supra note 47, at 213-16.
56. The bills under consideration in the hearings are set out in Appendix B.
57. E.g., Senate Hearings,supra note 47, at 680; House Hearings, supra note 47,
at 163.
58. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
59. House Hearings, supra note 47, at 213.
60. Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 707.
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very limited application, changing only those cases very similar to the Rands decision. For example, it was said in the
hearings that United States v. Twin City Power Co.61 would
not be changed by any of the proposed bills. Twin City was
said to stand only for the exercise of the navigation servitude
over a private property interest in water.6 2 However, it would
seem a mistake to construe Section 111 so narrowly. The language of Section 111 reads much broader than that interpretation. It is arguable, therefore, that those who testified before the committees failed to see that the Rands decision is
merely an extreme illustration of a previously settled rule of
law. For example, four years before Rands, one writer, citing
the Twin City decision, stated: "Beyond the boundaries set
by the ordinary high-water mark, the servitude affects abutting uplands in that value attributable to their location near
a navigable stream is non-compensable." 3 Clearly this interpretation of the Twin City case makes it indistinguishable
from Rands.
The better conclusion, therefore, would be that while the
Rands decision might have been the dominant topic of the
hearings, the proposed bills should not be limited solely to
that type of case. However, the great concern with Rands
in the hearings should still be heeded as a warning to those
who might attempt to stretch Section 111 very far beyond the
facts of that case."
61. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
62. This very distinction was made in the Senate Hearings. Senate Hearings,
supra note 47, at 692. There has also been a distinction made between
Twin City and Rands on the basis that in Twin City the power project was
contingent on a permit from the Federal Power Commission. Therefore,
unlike Rands, the value of the land depended on a permit, not the water.
Corker, Federal-State Relations in Water Rights-Administration and
Adjudication,, 17 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST-.... (1971).

To this writer,

the distinction is invalid. The Twin City Power Company's land was especially adaptable for hydroelectric power production. The site value remained whether the permit was obtained or not. Furthermore, the granting
of a permit is only authorization to go ahead with the project; it does
nothing to enhance the suitability of land for a project. It is difficult to
see the comparison between a governmental permit and the right to take
land without complete compensation. One aspect would not seem to justify
the other. Finally, while the reasoning behind the distinction seems plausible enough, it was not the reasoning followed by the Supreme Court in
the Twin City decision. The Court's own logic in that case was very easily
carried over to the Rands decision, indicating that they saw little difference
between that case and Twin City.
63. Morreale, supra note 3, at 62.
64. While it is still far too early for significant case law on this matter, one
decision did use Section 111 to allow full compensation for fixed improve-
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Another possible indication of the intended scope of
Section 111 can be seen in the concern expressed in the House
Hearings over the partial takings of property under the no
compensation rule. As previously pointed out,65 the preSection I11 rule had been that when only a part of riparian
land was taken, there was no compensation paid for the riparian value of the land, and any accretion in value to the
remaining land was deducted from the compensation paid.
Minority counsel for the House Public Works Committee
stated68 that this rule was "like having your cake and eating it
too.
The concern over the partial taking aspect of the no
compensation rule could be construed two ways. First, one
might argue from a narrow standpoint that Section 111 was
intended to cure only this particular aspect of the law of navigation servitude. Therefore, complete takings of property
that fall within the old rule would not be altered by Section
111. A second, and probably more accurate interpretation,
would be that the concern over the partial taking rule was
merely part of a broad policy to rectify injustice in the law
of compensation. The idea of giving a person less than adequate value for his land and then deducting benefits to the
remainder of the land probably serves more as an illustration
of the unreasonableness of certain aspects of the navigation
servitude than as a method of construing Section 111.
Finally, two additional items brought out in the hearings
serve to indicate the intent and purpose of Section 111. First,
in identical statements to both the House and the Senate
Public Works Committees, Harold DeMoss, an attorney from
Texas, pointed out that under existing rules of compensation
the Government is put in the position of being a condemnation broker. The prime example of this was in the Rands
decision,
[w]here the State of Oregon first took an option
from the landowner at a price using port site value,
ments whose value was dependent on access to navigable water, a fact
very much different than those in Rands. United States v. 967,905 Acres of
Land, 447 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971).
65. See pp. 507-08 8upra.
66. House Hearings, 8upra note 47, at 215.
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the Federal Government then condemned the property disregarding port site value, and the Federal
Government then conveyed the property to the State
of Oregon who leased it to a private corporation for
use as a port site. 7
Secondly, it was brought out that recognizing no value for a
land's worth because it has access to or utilizes water is a
form of governmental immunity which has no counterpart
in other areas of condemnation law, i.e., generally a state cannot exercise power over property without paying full compensation, nor can the federal government pay less than full
compensation for non-navigation projects."
It is argued,
therefore, that the compensation rules in the area of navigation servitude are a throwback to a different era, and since
governmental immunity is dying, so should these rules. The
significance of these two points is that they indicate a desire
for uniformity and fairness in compensation laws and may
serve as an argument for a broad application of Section 111.
Admittedly, most of the above discussion on the hearings
involves a certain amount of interpretation and speculation.
Nevertheless, the hearings at least seem to indicate a general
feeling that injustice was being perpetrated by certain applications of the no compensation rule. As Senator Tower stated:
The riparian landowner should have the full true
value of his property reimbursed by the Federal Government, for our Constitution states: "... Nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
I recommend this measure to the subcommittee
in order to implement the mandate of the Constitution in regard to riparian lands taken for public use."9
2. Committee Reports
Clear insights into the nature and meaning of Section 111
are extremely limited in the various committee reports. The
67. Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 685; House Hearings, supra note 47, at
162.
68. Id.
69. Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 708.
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Senate Committee Report"0 related only to the substituted
version of Section 111 that was dropped when the legislation
went into conference. Since the Senate Bill only authorized
a study of the ways in which the no compensation rule might
be changed,71 the Committee Report is of little use in interpreting the substantive law now contained in Section 111.
The House Report"2 on Section 111 did contain one important statement:
Under existing law, when riparian property adjacent to a navigable waterway is acquired by the
United States for a water resource development project, the valuation of the property taken does not
include any use of that property associated with
access to and use of the waterway. However, when
only a partial taking occurs, and some property remains adjacent to the waterway, there is deducted
from the just compensation that would otherwise be
paid the value of special benefits accuring [sic] to
the remaining real property because of its access to
or use of the waterway.
The Committee feels that this is an inequitable
situation. The section [111] accordingly provides for
the valuation of real property taken based upon its
access to or use of the navigable waterway when, in
fact, the use to which such property may reasonably
be put is dependent upon such access to or utilization
of the navigable water. This section makes no change
in the existing law with respect to the offsetting of
special benefits to remaining real property against
the just compensation that would otherwise be paid
for the real property taken and for damages to remaining real property resulting [from] the taking
the purpose for which the real property is taken."
The House Report would seem to make it quite clear that the
price to be paid for a partial taking of property will include
values resulting from access to and utilization of the water.
However, any benefits which accrue to the remaining land
by virtue of the taking will still be deducted from the compen70.

S. REP. No. 91-1422, supra note 51.

71. The full text of the Senate Bill is set out in Appendix C.
72. H.R. REP. No. 91-1665, supra note 49.
73. Id. at 31.
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sation paid. 4 Using the same example previously employed
to illustrate the working of the old law,7 5 Section 111 provides
the following results. A owns a 40 acre tract of land bordering on a navigable stream. The land is particularly valuable
as an industrial port site. The Government condemns onehalf of A's tract for the purpose of constructing a dam and
submerging the land. A non-riparian 20 acre tract has a fair
market value of $10,000. A's tract, because of its special value,
is worth $20,000. Under Section 111, A will be paid for the
$20,000 value of his land. However, the 20 acres not condemned
that was formerly non-riparian will now become riparian
land and, by virtue of the Government project, valuable as an
industrial port site. Hence, from the $20,000 paid to A, there
will still be dediucted the increase in value which accrues to
that portion of his land which was formerly non-riparian
land, i.e., $10,000. A, therefore, will be compensated $10,000
for the 20 acres of land taken from him, and he will retain
possession of 20 acres of land now worth $20,000. This would
clearly seem to be an equitable result for A should not be
compensated for a value in land created solely by a Government project. Section 111, therefore, has actually worked to
turn the highly unjust partial taking law into a reasonable
result.
The House Report, 6 also very sparse, made one important point:
The Conferees wish to stress for the purposes of
clarification that any decrease or increase in the
fair market value of the real property prior to the
date of valuation caused by the public improvement
for which such property is acquired, or by the likelihood that the property would be acquired for such
improvement, other than that due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the
owner, will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property."
74. This feature of the law is amply illustrated by the fact that Section 111
was codified as Section 595(a) under Title 33 of the United States Code.
Section 595 is the old law providing for deductions from compensation of
accretions in value to land.
75. See p. 508 8upra.
76. H.R. REP. No. 91-1782, aupra note 52.
77. Id.
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Essentially, this is an elaboration of the House Committee
Report. Perhaps two illustrations will provide some meaning to the House Conference statement. First, A is a nonriparian owner of land worth $10,000. B's land is contiguous
with A's and abuts a navigable stream. The Government
condemns B's land to build a dam. Because of the dam, A's
land will become riparian and much more valuable on the
open market. If the Government should then decide to condemn A's land for recreational facilities, the compensation
paid A will not include the increase in the land's value, that
is, it will be valued as non-riparian land. 8
Second, A owns a tract of land riparian to a navigable
stream. The land is valuable as an industrial port site. The
Government proposes to build a dam, the waters of which
will inundate one-half of A's land. Because of the proposed
project, the remaining land loses value, the location of the
dam destroying any possible port site use. If the Government
should then decide to condemn A's remaining land, it will still
be valued as industrial port site property. However, even if
A remains in possession of the remaining one-half of his land,
he cannot claim as part of his compensation the decrease in
value to that land caused by the Government project.
While the committee reports do provide some small insights into how the congressional committees felt Section 111
should operate, their usefulness is of limited value. It would
seem to be a better proposition that when legislation of potential impact such as Section 111 is before Congress, the
meaning and limitations of the new law be expressed before
passage, rather than leaving its construction up to the imagination of the courts.
3. Comparison and Conbrast of Bills Preceding Section
711

It has already been indicated" that prior to the passage
of Section 111, there had been several similar pieces of legislation introduced into Congress. Despite the similarities,
78. For a case with a very similar fact situation see United States v. Reynolds,
397 U.S. 14 (1970).
79. See pp. 510-11 aupra.
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Section 111 and its predecessors do differ in certain respects.
Therefore, a comparison and contrast of Section 111 and the
bills which preceded it would seem relevant to any thorough
analysis of Section 111.
Perhaps one of the more obvious differences between
prior bills and Section 111 is that Section 111 does not contain
a specific rejection of the navigation servitude. Two of the
bills8" that predate Section 111 clearly stated that in determining compensation for the taking of land, the navigation servitude will be disregarded.81 Section 111 contains no similar
language. However, a close reading of Section 111 and its
predecessors would seem to indicate that what the early bills
said explicitly about disregarding the navigation servitude,
Section 111 says implicitly. Section 111 states:
In all cases where real property shall be taken
by the United States for the public use in connection
with any improvement of rivers, harbors, canals, or
waterways of the United States, and in all condemnation proceedings by the United States to acquire
lands or easements for such improvements, the compensation to be paid for real property taken by the
United States above the normal high water mark of
navigable waters of the United States shall be the
fair market value of such real property based upon
all uses to which such real property may reasonably
be put, including its highest and best use, any of
which uses may be dependent upon access to or
utilization of such navigable waters.
The clear import of this language would seem to be that the
navigation servitude will be disregarded in the taking of
riparian uplands.
Furthermore, Section 111 may not expressly reject the
navigation servitude because to do so would be inaccurate
and misleading. Actually, neither Section 111 nor the earlier
bills do much to change the navigation servitude itself. The
basic feature of the navigation servitude is that it allows the
United States to exercise a paramount right over navigable
80. H.R. 12383, 91st Cong., 1st Sess (1969) (the full text of the bill is reprinted
in Appendix A) ; S. 3815, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969) (the full text of the
bill is reprinted in Appendix B).
81. See Appendices A and B.
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waters. Clearly, neither Section 111 nor its predecessors do
anything to change this part of the navigation servitude. All
that Section ll and the earlier bills alter is the rule of no
compensation as it applies to takings above the high water
mark of navigable waters. Therefore, when one looks at the
navigation servitude as a whole, Section 111 has not brought
about any great changes. Hence, to put language in Section
111 that explicitly says the navigation servitude is to be disregarded would have been a confusing inaccuracy.
Two of the bills"2 introduced into Congress prior to Section 111 clearly stated that a potential future use of land due
to its riparian location will be compensable. 3 Section 111
contains no such language, and a landowner claiming value
due to a possible future use could meet with some difficulty.
However, the language of Section 111 would not seem to
justify such a strict interpretation. Section 111, in reference
to the amount of compensation to be paid, states: "[T]he
fair market value of such real property [will be] based upon
all uses to which such real property may reasonably be put,
including its highest and best use." The use of the words
"may" and "highest and best use" would seem to indicate
that Section 111 also contemplates payment for future uses
to which the real property may be put.
Perhaps one of the most notable differences between Section 111 and previous bills is that Section 111 lacks any mention of its application to riparian land. An early House Bill"
limited its application to "riparian property located on a
navigable water."" Subsequent bills8" referred to compensation for "riparian use""7 of navigable waters. The predecessors of Section 111, therefore, would indicate that their application was limited only to situations which involved riparian
land on navigable waters. But, Section 111 discusses compen82. S. 3815, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 17505, 91st Cong., 2 Sess. (1970).
See Appendix B.
83. See Appendix B.
84. H.R. 12383, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The full text of the bill is reprinted
in Appendix A.
85. See Appendix A.
86. S. 3815, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ; H.R. 17505, 91st Cong., 2d Sess (1970).
See Appendix B.
87. See Appendix B.
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sation in terms of "access to or utilization of" navigable
waters, "compensations to be paid for real property taken by
the United States above the normal high water mark of navigable waters," and "real property ... taken by the United
States for public use in connection with any improvement of
rivers, harbors, canals, or waterways."
The obvious question then becomes whether Section 111
applies to more than just land that abuts navigable water.
The fact that Section 111 makes no use of the word "riparian"
tends to indicate that it has a broader coverage than previous
bills. Clearly this seems to be the case since Section 111
applies to partial as well as complete takings of property.
To illustrate this, A owns non-riparian land with a flowage
easement on I3's land. B's land is riparian to a navigable
river. The Government condemns B's land to build a dam
and destroys A's flowage easement. A would be compensated
for the taking of the easement 8 8 and, under Section 111,
would be compensated for the full value of his loss. 9
Finally, there is the total disparity between Section 111
as passed by the House and the substituted version of Section
111 passed by the Senate.9" The Senate Bill provided that the
Department of the Army was to undertake a study of "the
basis of determining the amount of compensation to be paid
the owners of riparian lands on navigable waters when acquired by the United States."'" The Senate Bill is surprising
in that both the House and the Senate Public Works Committees heard very similar condemnations of the navigation
servitude's no compensation rule. Yet, the House decided to
adopt an immediate cure, while the Senate opted for the more
conservative approach of authorizing a study. The Senate
Committee Report provided some answer to this shift in attitude when it stated:
The Committee feels that before general legislation providing for a system of relief from the diffi88. 2 SACKMAN & VANBRUNT, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.72 (rev. 3d ed.
1970).
89. For a somewhat similar fact situation, see United States v. Virginia Elee.
& Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
90. S. 4572, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 109 (1970). The full text of the bill is reprinted in Appendix C.
91. See Appendix C.
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culties associated with the navigation servitude is
adopted, there should be a thorough study made of
the need for such legislation and of the form of relief
which should be provided.2
On the basis of the Senate Bill, one might argue that
Section 111 was passed only for a limited purpose-to overturn United States v. Rands. Two points can be made against
this argument. First, the Senate Bill did not necessarily
indicate Congressional reluctance to dispose of the rule of no
compensation; rather it only indicated a desire for legislation which will effectively deal with the problem. Section
111, therefore, might be more of a temporary stopgap, pending
even more comprehensive legislation." Second, and most obvious, is that the Senate Bill, whatever it may have meant,
was not enacted, while Section 111 was.
Admittedly, discussing the differences between Section
111 and its predecessors may seem a little like academic hairsplitting. Nevertheless, legislation which dies in committee
can often reveal much about the current state of the law.
From all indications, the scope of Section 111 should not be
limited by the bills that preceded it. The language of prior
bills may not have been exactly the same as that of Section 111,
but there seems little reason to believe that they do not express
essentially the same policy. The most significant aspect of the
prior bills and Section 111 would seem to be the general
desire on the part of Congress to conclusively eliminate the
application of the no compensation rule from certain takings
of property.
C. Definitions
While the legislative analysis of Section 111 deals in
generalities, there is much to be learned from examining the
specific terminology of Section 111. The following are definitions of some of the more important terms used in Section
111. The reader should take note, however, that most of these
definitions are based upon meanings commonly given to these
92. S. REP. No. 91-1422, supra note 51, at 59.
93. Somewhat the same feeling was expressed in a ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON
NAVIGATION SERVITUDE, Federal Navigation Servitude, 6 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 132 (1971).
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terms by the courts and writers. Hence, it can only be assumed
that Section 111 uses the terms in the same manner.
1. Real Property
Section 111 speaks in terms of real property taken by the
United States. Any complete definition of real property is
necessarily quite involved and complicated. 4 However, it
should be sufficient for the purposes of this comment to define
real property as the surface of land, its emblements, easements95 and those things placed on the land with the intention
of permanently improving the freehold. 6
Furthermore, a "right to the flow and use of water...
is real property."9" The Supreme Court has said that a "riparian right is property and is valuable, and, though it must
be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it
cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired.' '9
However, while the definition of real property includes rights
in water, Section 111 is limited to only those takings above
the "normal high water mark." Therefore, it seems fairly
evident that the taking of water itself is not compensable
under Section 111. Absent any taking of land, an individual
will not be compensated merely because the Government has
exercised its right of navigation servitude over water and
deprived the landowner of that water. Real property, therefore, would seem to be restricted to two things under Section
111: (1) the land and the structures; and (2) the access to
and use that can be made of the water, but not the water itself or the right to it.
2. Taken
Section 111 limits its application to those instances in
which real property is "taken by the United States." Gen94. See generally 2 SACKMAN & VANBRUNT, supra note 88, at § 5.
95. Id. at § 2.1.
96. BuRY, R.AL PROPERTY §§ 8-11 (3d ed. 1965). This definition has no bearing
on the type of interest owned in a particular piece of real property, e.g.,
leaseholds, reversionary interests, etc. Such interests generally fall within the broader term "property" as used by the fifth amendment.
97. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST
28 (1942).
98. Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870).
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erally, questions as to whether there has been a taking have
arisen under the meaning of that term as used in the fifth
amendment. In that setting, the term has been given a broad
meaning to include "[a]ny limitation on the free use and
enjoyment of property.""
The Supreme Court has found a taking to exist even
when the owner of property is not directly deprived of his
title.1"' Hence, the test of a taking would seem to be whether
the land has been interfered with in its use or value."' It
should be kept in mind, however, that the discussion above of
real property probably limits Section 111 to an actual physical
taking of some property.
3. Public Use
That real property may only be taken for the "public
use" is a traditional limitation on the power of eminent
domain.'0 2 Giving meaning to that term, however, is often
a more difficult matter. An extended analysis of the public
use is beyond the scope of this paper' and can be simply
defined as
anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the
inhabitants of a [nation] . . . [or] manifestly contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of
the whole community."'
99. 2 SACKMAN & VANBRUNT, supra note 88, at § 6.1[1].
100. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
101. In United States v. Cress, the Supreme Court said:
Where the government by the construction of a dam or other public
works so floods land belonging to an individual as to substantially
destroy their value there is a taking within the scope of the Fifth
Amendment. While the government does not directly proceed to
appropriate the title, yet it takes away the use and value; when
that is done it is little consequence in whom the fee may be vested.
243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
102. 1 SACKMAN & VANBRUNT, supra note 88, at § 1.11.
103. See 2A SACKMAN & VANBRUNT, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7 (rev.
ed. 1970).
104. Id. at § 7.2[2].

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss2/7

24

Brittain: Navigation Servitude - The Shifting Rule of No Compensation

1972

COMMENTS

525

4. Improvement
Use of the word "improvement" in Section 111 is particularly troublesome. Section 111 can only come into play
when the taking by the United States is for the " improvement
of rivers, harbors, canals, or waterways." On the basis of
that language, it could be argued that the word "improvement" means only those projects in furtherance of navigation."0 5 If such a narrow definition should become the accepted test of an improvement, it is obvious that a great
many takings of real property will not fall within the scope of
Section 111.
It is suggested that to confine Section 111 to only those
improvements in aid of navigation would be incorrect. The
legislative history of Section 111 clearly indicates that it was
intended to cover takings of riparian uplands pursuant to the
navigation servitude, regardless of the project involved. Furthermore, it has already been shown that the test of whether
a project falls within the navigation servitude is very broad
and almost totally dependent upon congressional determination.0 It would seem highly unjust, therefore, to allow Congress to choose when the power of navigation servitude (and
the rule of no compensation) will be exercised, yet make the
meaning of "improvement" narrower than that power. The
test of what constitutes an improvement should be satisfied
as soon as it is determined that Congress is acting under the
navigation servitude.
If one case can serve as any guide, it appears that a broad
definition of "improvement" will be followed by the courts.
0 7 apparently the
In United States v. 967,905 Acres of Land,"
only reported case to deal with Section 111, the Government
was exercising its power of eminent domain to make a wilderness area free of commercial business. The land involved in
the suit bordered on a large navigable lake within the designated wilderness area. The landowner operated a sports
fishing and hunting resort which made extensive use of the
105. This definition of improvement has been suggested by one writer. Corker,
supra, note 62.
106. See pp. 504-06 eupra.
107. 447 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971).
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lake. When the question of valuation came before the court,
the Government contended that both the land and the fixtures
should be valued by the Rands rule. Section 111, it was argued, did not apply because no improvement of the lake was
to result from the takings. Section 111, said the Government,
is "limited to 'conventional' improvements such as the construction of locks and dams and projects for bank stabilization or for the stabilization or deepening of the channels of
navigable stream.""0 8
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, saw the
test of an improvement to be whether the Government project served the public interest:
Regardless of the limitations to which the Government's powers with respect to navigable waters
may be subject, it is clear that those powers are broad,
and that the public interests which those powers are
designed to serve are also broad.
Those interests are not limited to the promotion
and fostering of trade and commerce along and
upon our waterways or to the control or prevention
of destructive floods. They include, in our estimation, those interests which are aesthetic, ecological,
and environmental as well as those which are economic and commercial.
[W]hen the Government commands civilization
and business to retreat from a given area so that it
may be preserved in its natural state for the enjoyment and refreshment of all of us, it may fairly be
said that the Government is acting to "improve"
the area and the waterways therein. We so hold."0 9
Clearly this would seem the better definition of an improvement. Section 111 was intended as relief to landowners whose
property was taken and paid for at prices less than its full
worth. It would be inequitable, therefore, to allow any construction of the word "improvement" to defeat that intent.
108. Id. at 771.
109. Id. at 771.
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5. Condemnation Proceedings
Section 111 speaks of both "takings" by the United States
and "condemnation proceedings." It would appear that the
use of the two terms was for reasons of accuracy. A condemnation proceeding, while pending, does not interfere with the
owner's possession of his property. Technically, then, a condemnation proceeding does not constitute a taking of property.1 ' Therefore, the language of Section 111 covers two
events: (1) where a de facto taking of property is involved;
and (2) where the taking is being accomplished by a judicial
proceeding.
Nevertheless, the use of both "taken" and "condemnation proceeding" in Section 111 is troublesome. Takings in
Section 111 are used in reference to real property, while condemnation proceeding is used in connection with acquisitions
of land and easements. To this writer, the use of the two
terms in separate contexts is confusing, unexplainable, and a
source of potential problems in the future."'
6. Normal High Water Mark
"Normal high water mark" is one of the most significant
terms in Section 111 in that it draws the line between the compensable and the non-compensable workings of the navigation
servitude. Nonetheless, it is an easy term to define. Simply
stated, the normal high water mark is "the highest level
at which the river or other body of water stands during normal conditions, excluding the extremes of flood stages during
the winter and spring and low-water stages during summer
droughts.",,".
7. Navigable Waters
Section 111 speaks of "compensation to be paid for real
property taken by the United States above the normal high
water mark of navigable waters of the United States." There
110. 2 SACKMAN & VANBRUNT, supra note 88, at § 6.13[3].
111. For a brief discusion of this see TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 193.
For a somewhat different defi112. Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 686.
nition see 2 SACKMAN & VANBRUNT, supra note 88, at § 5.7913[4].
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is nothing in the legislative history of Section 111 to indicate
what Congress may have intended to mean by the term "navigable waters." Once again,"'s therefore, it is necessary to
ponder what is meant by that term and the illusive concepts
that accompany it.
Despite its unknown nature, the meaning of navigable
waters is probably the most important term to an understanding of Section 111. However broad navigable waters is defined is also how broad Section 111 may be. To illustrate
this, the Government decides to build a dam on a navigable
river. A's land abuts a non-navigable tributary of that river.
Because of the dam, water is backed up the tributary and partially floods A's land. Can A be compensated for the riparian
value of his land under Section 111? The answer to the
question would ultimately turn on the definition given "navigable waters."
It might be argued that navigable waters, as the term is
used in Section 111, means just what it says-navigable in
fact. However, authorities in the field of the navigation
servitude would probably reject such a narrow construction
of the term. In fact, navigable waters may very well include
any water that the Government declares to be navigable. One
writer on the subject has stated:
Any stream-system in the nation could . . . be
subjected to federal control by making any portion
of it navigable. This would bring within the scope
of the navigation power the non-navigable stretches
and tributaries of the system, if affecting the capacity of the mainstream. Theoretically at least, there
are no waters in the United States immune from the
navigation power." '
The issue would appear to remain, however, whether those
waters subject to the navigation power and those waters that
can be called "navigable" mean the same thing. The answer
can be critical to the use of Section 111. It will be seen later
in this comment that defining navigable waters so broadly
113. See pp. 501-04 supra.
114. Morreale, supra note 8, at 8-9.
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as to include non-navigable tributaries could have some surprising results to the landowner.
8. Fair Market Value
To an extent, fair market value is defined by the language of Section 111 when it states that
the compensation to be paid for real property . . .
shall be the fair market value of such real property
based upon all uses to which such real property may
reasonably be put, including its highest and best use,
any of which uses may be dependent upon access to
or utilization of such navigable waters.
A prepared statement in the Congressional hearings supplemented to this definition by stating that the words "fair
market value" are "the normal and ordinary tests used in condemnation cases for determining compensation due the landowner, and would include the concepts of 'willing buyer-willing
seller.' "111
D. Section 111 and Past Case Law
While the foregoing analysis provides some insight into
Section 111 in the abstract, the true test of any law comes
from its application to particular fact situations. lowever,
since Section 111 is a new law, there has been no factual application. Nevertheless, pre-Section 111 cases do provide ample
fact situations that can be useful in defining the meaning of
Section 111.
The method of analysis here will divide the fact situations into roughly three categories: (1) the United States
condemns land and the owner claims compensation for its
special location or site value, where (a) the property is located
on a navigable stream, or (b) the property is located on a
non-navigable stream; (2) the United States prevents or
burdens the use of a navigable river, its flow or its bed; (3)
the United States raises the level of the navigable mainstream,
115. Senate HeaTing8, gupra note 47, at 686; House Hearings, supra note 47, at

163. For use of the term in a Section 111 case see United States v. 967,905
Acres of Land, 447 F.2d 764, 711 (8th Cir. 1971).
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damaging private property, where (a) the property is situated along a navigable mainstream, or (b) the property is
situated along a non-navigable mainstream.' 0
1. Special location or Site Value
a. Property Located on a Navigable Stream
This class of cases includes the Bands decision and is,
therefore, the easiest to place within the intended scope of
Section 111. Indeed, one of the earlier decisions in this area
hinted at a Section 111-type holding. In Olson v. United
States,"7 land that bordered on a navigable lake was condemned by the Government for the storage of water. As part
of the compensation, the landowner claimed that his property
had a special use as a reservoir site. The offered proof of this
special value was that electric power companies had been
competing for the right to dam the water in the lake, and any
such project had to involve the purchase of the landowner's
property. The Government denied that any special use could
be made of the land, contending instead that it should be
valued as a farm. The Court accepted the Government's
theory of valuation but apparently not on the basis of the
navigation servitude. Instead, the Court held that the claimed
special value of the land was an impossibility due to the
circumstances.
When regard is had to the number of parcels, private owners, Indian tribes and sovereign proprietors
to be dealt with, it is clear that there is no foundation for opinion evidence to the effect that it was
practicable for private parties to acquire the flowage
easements in question.'
The Court did not say that ability to use the water as a power
dam site was a non-compensable use of the land.
Therefore, the Olson decision would seem to have held
nothing contrary to Section 111. Section 111 also denies compensation for speculative or impossible uses of land when it
116.

The method of dividing up the case law was adopted from Morreale, eupra
note 3, at 31-63.
117. 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
118. Id. at 260.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss2/7

30

Brittain: Navigation Servitude - The Shifting Rule of No Compensation

1972

COMMENTS

speaks of "compensation... for... all uses to which such real
property may reasonably be put." If anything, the Olson
decision may aid in future interpretations of Section 111 by
establishing the test of reasonableness as depending on (1)
physical adaptability and (2) physical possibility.
The use of shore lands for reservoir purposes prior
to the taking shows merely the physical possibility of
so controlling the level of the lake. But physical

adaptability alone cannot be deemed to affect market value. There must be a reasonable possibility
that the owner could use his tract together with the
other shore lands for reservoir purposes or that
another could acquire all lands or easements necessary for that use.'

In effect, then, Section 111 would seem to be doing little more
than codifying the Olson case.
The first Supreme Court decision to clearly hold that a
value in land due to the flow of the water is non-compensable
was United States v. Twin City Power Co.' ° On the facts
of that case,. 2' it would appear that Section 111 has overruled
Twin City. 2 As one writer on the subject described it,
"Rands was so directly based on
Twin City that any shot
23
aimed at it must hit Twin City."'

Nevertheless, it should not be presumed that the Twin
City decision is going to be given up without a fight. It
seems certain that the Government will have a formidable
argument against Section 111 overruling Twin City if they
press for a distinction between a value in water and a value in
land. Twin City, it could argue, involved a value in water,
while Section 111 applies only to values in land. The Government's authority for such a distinction could be the Twin
City case itself.
However, the logic and language of Section 111 would
not seem to substantiate such an argument. In the first place,
119. Id. at 256-57.

120. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
121. See pp. 506-07 supra.
122. For some doubts and this writer's feelings on those doubts see Corker,
supra note 62.
123. TRELEASE, eupra note 1, at 192.
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it is questionable if anyone really knows the difference between a value in the flow of a stream and a value in land. On
the basis of one decision, it would appear that the Supreme
Court has a difficult time in distinguishing the difference itself. In United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co.,"' the Court found lock and canal uses of land to be valuable but denied any value for hydroelectric uses since it
was a value in the flow of the stream. To this writer it
is hard to find any rational distinction between the two uses.
Furthermore, there may be reason to argue that Section I11
destroys whatever distinction might have once existed between
a value in the land and a value in water. Section 111 speaks
in terms of the "highest and best use" and "utilization" of
the water, making no distinction between non-compensable
values in water and compensable values in land. Finally, to
split hairs on values in land and water would seem to violate
the broad congressional policy of Section 111 to eliminate
unjust rules of compensation.
One final point should be made with respect to the effect
of Section 111 on the Twin City case. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Twin City, seemed to destroy the previously established distinction between high and low water
marks. At least two previous decisions.2 5 determined compensation on the basis of whether the land taken was above or
below a high water mark. Justice Douglas, however, stated
that "the location of the land [is] not determinative."' 2 6
Section 111, by expressly distinguishing between laud above
and below the high water mark, would seem to repudiate Justice Douglas' remark. One certainly could argue that since
Section 111 only discusses compensation above the normal
high water mark, by implication it is denying compensation
below that mark.
Finally, what of the taking of an easement by the United
States ? In United States v. Virginia Electric &fPower Co.,'
the respondent owned a flowage easement over lands border124. 229 U.S. 53 (1915).
125. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United
States v. Chicago, MI. St. P. & Pac. P. R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
126. 350 U.S. 222, 277 (1956).
127. 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
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ing on a navigable river. The easement was to be used by
the respondent when it constructed a hydroelectric dam. The
Government, for a separate dam and reservoir project, condemned some of the land for its own flowage easement. The
Government's taking encompassed the respondent's property.
The fee owner of the land agreed to a compensation of one
dollar, and the respondent intervened, seeking additional
compensation. The Court held that the respondent must be
paid for the taking of the easement but the amount could not
include a value that depended on the flow of a river.
Except for the involvement of an easement, this case
would seem to be no differen than Twin City. Therefore,
most of what has been said about that case would seem equally
applicable here. It is worth mentioning, however, that, as in
Twin City, the Court in this decision said that a use of land
for hydroelectric power generation was a value in water, not
land. Hence, as in the Twin City case, the Government will
probably dispute the application of Section 111 to this fact
situation.
b. Property Located on a Non-Navigable Mainstream
Within this particular area of the law, only one case
should need discussion. In United States v. Grand River Dam
Authority,"8 a power company -was the owner of land abutting the Grand River, a non-navigable tributary of the Arkansas River. Prior to the taking involved in this suit, Congress had made the Grand River a part of the Arkansas
River Basin Project. The power company had permission
from the Government to develop the Grand River for the
production of electricity. However, pursuant to the Arkansas
River Pioject, the Government had constructed its own project on the Grand River, ultimately causing condemnation of
70 acres of land owned by the power company. The power
company then sought compensation for loss of the water
power rights. The Supreme Court saw no difference between
the application of the navigation servitude to navigable or
non-navigable waters and stated: "When the United States
128. 368 U.S. 229 (1960).
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appropriates the flow either of a navigable or nonnavigable
stream pursuant to its superior power under the Commerce
established prerogatives and is beClause, it is exercising
29
holden to no one.'1
Since this decision involved an express exercise of power
by Congress over a non-navigable tributary of a navigable
river, it might be argued that the tributary could be categorized as navigable water. 3 ° If one can accept this argument, there is little reason to believe that Section 111 would
not alter the rule in the Grand River case. The general purposes of Section 111 would seem to dictate that there be no
difference between takings on a navigable stream or takings
on its tributaries. Certainly logic cannot justify such a
distinction.
However, to assure the application of Section 111, such
a power company would now be wise to plead damages to the
upland parcels in the taking instead of rights in the water.
This type of pleading would appear to be commanded by the
language of Section 111 when it speaks of takings of real
property above the normal high water mark.
2. Interference with the Use of a Navigable River, its
Flow, or its Bed
In this category of cases, the United States has not taken
any private property; rather, it has deprived that property
of some particular use of or access to water. Therefore, barring the more esoteric arguments, the taking and high water
mark requirements would appear to preclude the application
of Section 111 to most of these cases. Three examples should
make this point clear.
First: A is a riparian landowner on a navigable stream.
The Government, in the course of constructing a naval base,
dredges out a bay located more than a mile from A's property.
The dredged materials are placed in the stream on which A's
property is located. A alleges that the dredging operations
have destroyed the navigability of the stream and decreased
129. Id. at 233.
130. See notes 13-17, 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
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the value of his upland parcels. No dredged materials were
ever placed on A's land. Held: the constitutional power of the
federal government to regulate commerce may be exercised to
block navigation at one place in order to aid it in another
without compensating for loss of use of the navigable
stream.'
Second: B owns a bridge that spans a navigable river.
The Secretary of War, in accordance with the law, declares
the bridge to be an unreasonable interference with navigation
and orders the bridge altered. Held:
If the injury complained of is only incidental to the
legitimate exercise of governmental powers for the
public good, then there is no taking of property for
the public use, and a right to compensation, on account of such injury, does not attach under the Constitution.'
Third: C builds a wharf on navigable water within harbor lines established by the Government. The Government
subsequently decides to improve navigation in these waters
and changes the harbor line. By changing the harbor line,
part of the wharf now extends into the navigable waters and
is taken by the Government without compensation. Held:
the Government can relocate a harbor line, and is not required to pay compensation for the improvements originally
within the old harbor line. 3 '
Clearly all of these examples fall outside the intended
scope of Section 111, and their holdings remain valid rules
of law today.
131. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1944).
132. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 397 (1907). Even if it
would be arguable in the case that Section 111 should apply, e.g., the
foundations of the bridge are located on land above the normal high water
mark, policy could dictate that it should not be applied. In the jargon of
one writer, the bridge company would be classified as a spoiler, "the
person who has deprived the public of its rights to a free navigation, though
e may not have appropriated them to his own use." TRELEASE, supra note
1, at 184. It would seem just, therefore, that the spoiler not be paid when
he has to remove or alter his obstruction.
133. Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915). That
Section 111 does not apply to this type of case is made clear by the ABA's
efforts to have legislation, enacted apart from Section 111, to cure the
harbor lines situation. See note 44 supra.
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There is one decision in this category that is arguably
overruled by Section 111. In United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,134 a power company owned land bordering on a navigable river. In order to develop the river for
production of water power, the company (with permission of
the Secretary of War) constructed dams, dikes and forebays
in the river. The Government then instituted a condemnation proceeding over the river in order to improve its navigability. The condemnation proceeding against the water company involved all of the structures in the river as well as some
eight acres of upland. In denying compensation for the right
to generate power, the Supreme Court held that
every such structure in the water of a navigable river
is subordinate to the right of navigation, and subject
to the obligation to suffer the consequences of fte
improvement of navigation, and must be removed if
Congress in the assertion of its power over navigation shall determine that their continuance is detrimental to the public interest in the navigation of the
river.185
Despite the broad language of this rule, the Supreme Court
did allow compensation for the locks and canals but denied
any payment for the taking of the water company's ability
to generate power. Such an ambiguous holding has led many
writers to conclude that there is no reconciling ChandlerDunbar with any rational interpretation of the no compensation rule.'
The language of the Chandler-Dunbardecision was later
used as a basis for the holding in Twin City. Therefore, it
is certainly arguable that if Section 111 covers Twin City,
it covers Chandler-Dunbaras well. However, if Section 111
is to be used, the claimed compensation would have to be
based on the loss of ability to generate power as it affects
the upland parcels. "Thus transformed, Chandler-Dunbaris
squarely within the terms of Section 111.''.
134.
135.
136.
137.

229 U.S. 53 (1913).
Id. at 70.
For example, see Morreale, supra note 3, at 47-50.
TRELEASE, supra note 1, at 192.
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3. Damage Attributable to the Raised Level of a Navigable Mainstream
a. Property Situated Along a Navigable Mainstream
In United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co.,"' the
federal government had constructed a series of locks and
dams on the upper reaches of the Mississippi River. The effect of the project was to raise the water level of the River
several feet. The railroad was a riparian landowner on the
river. The Government's project caused some of the railroad's
land between the high and low water mark to be inundated.
The railroad sought compensation for the land covered. As
might be expected, the Supreme Court denied the railroad's
claim.
The dominant power of the federal Government
...extends to the entire bed of a stream, which includes the lands below the ordinary high-water mark.
The exercise of the power within these limits is not an
invasion of any private property right in such lands
for which the the United States must make compensation."'
Section 111 would clearly seem to fail in its application
to this case. If anything, Section 111 would strengthen Chicago by expressly limiting itself to lands above the normal
high water mark. 4 '
138. 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
139. Id. at 596-97.
140. A claimant's only hope for getting a different ruling in such a situation
would have to depend more on the facts of the case than on the application
of Section 111. If the claimant could argue that the property flooded in
such a case was above the normal high water mark, then Section 111 would
apply. The Court's definition of the high water mark is essentially the
same as adopted in this comment. See p. 527 supra. However, two
writers have adopted a somewhat different definition of a high water mark,
saying that it is a line on the bank of a river covered by water long enough
to deprive it of vegetation. Morreale, supra note 3, at 39; 2 SACKMAN &
VANBRUNT, supra note 88, at § 5.7913[4]. In Chicago, the Court stated that
"[t]he lands . . . were lowlands which, prior to the improvement, were to a
great extent covered with trees and scrub." United States v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P.R. Co. 312 U.S. 592, 595 (1941). Therefore, if such a claimant
could successfully argue that lack of vegetation is the high water mark
test, it could claim compensation under Section 111. Absent the argument,
however, the claimant's situation would not be changed by Section 111.
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b. Property Situated Along a Non-Navigable Stream
Within this category fall several decisions that may be
altered by Section 111. In some cases, however, the alteration may limit compensation rather than expand it.
In United States v. Cress,' the Government had constructed a series of locks and dams on a navigable mainstream.
The project caused the water level of the stream to rise to
such an extent that private land on a tributary was affected.
Two individual landowners on the tributary sought compensation from the Government for damages caused by the
raised water level. One landowner claimed that the raised
water caused frequent flooding on some seven acres of his
land and destroyed a ford across the tributary. The second
landowner claimed that the raised water level had destroyed
the necessary water drop to run a mill. The Supreme Court
allowed compensation to both claimants. Compensating the
first landowner may not seem so unusual since there was an
actual taking of property.'4 2 However, compensating the
second landowner was strange, for clearly the Court was
awarding a value in the flow of a stream. In reference to
the second landowner, the Court said:
The right to have the water flow away from the mill
dam unobstructed, except as in the course of nature,
is not a mere easement or appurtenance, but exists
by the law of nature as an inseparable part of the
land. A destruction of this right is a taking of a part
of the land.' 43
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co.,'4 4 held
that raising water levels artificially on a navigable mainstream is not a compensable taking. Yet, Cress holds that an
artificial raising of the water on the tributary of a mainstream is a compensable taking. In regard to this apparent
dichotomy, it has been suggested that
no reasonable justification exists for the greater
protection of the "tributary-riparian" as opposed to
the "mainstream-riparian" in the face of the valid
141.
142.
143.
144.

243 U.S. 316 (1917).
For the Courts' holding on this matter see note 10 supra.
United States v. Cress, supra note 141, at 330.
Chicago was decided 24 years after Cress, but did not expressly overrule it.
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exercise of federal power to deal with and alter the
level of the stream to any extent up to the ordinary
high-water mark.1 4
Because of this ambiguity, it is a very real possibility
that the Government could claim that Section 111 legislatively overrules Cress. If the Government could successfully
contend that Section 111 applies to the non-navigable tributaries of a navigable mainstream,1 4 then Section 111, with
the high water mark requirement, would overrule what Cress
said about payment for destruction of private property below
that mark. Thus, it could be said that Section 111 has now
erased the dichotomy between the Chicago and Cress decisions.
Section 111 has made it clear that only property above the
normal high water mark will be paid for, be it tributaryriparian or mainstream-riparian. Hence, the mill owner in
Cress, unable to show an above water mark taking, would not
be compensated at all.
Whether the Court would be willing to accept such an
argument is debatable. Nevertheless, in view of the confused
state of the law in this area, such an argument should be
expected.
Regardless of Section 111, the Cress decision may now
have only limited validity due to the decision in United
States v. Willow River Power Co. 4 ' In that case, the Willow
River was a non-navigable tributary of the St. Croix, a
navigable river. A power company had altered the course of
the Willow River and built a dam on it near its outlet into the
St. Croix. By these alterations, the power company was able
to construct a water drop of some 22 feet. The power company
owned all of the land on which the dam was constructed. Some
30 miles downstream on the St. Croix, the Government constructed a dam, causing the river to rise some three feet above
its normal high water mark. The raised water level seriously
hampered the power company's ability to produce electricity,
145.

The justification, reasonable or otherwise,
Morreale, supra note 8, at 44.
by the courts simply seems to be that navigable streams are subject to the
servitude, while non-navigable tributaries are not. But, while the distinction may justify the power of navigation servitude, it does not explain
non-compensability.

146.

See notes 13-17, 113-14 supra and accompanying text.

147. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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ultimately resulting in a suit for damages. The Court denied
compensation, saying that the "claimant's interest or advantage in the high-water level of the St. Croix River as a runoff for tail waters to maintain its power head is not a right
protected by law..' . 8 Cress was distinguished on the basis
that there the level of the tributary was raised, while in Willow River the level of a navigable stream had been raised.
Nevertheless, the claims in both cases were for damages to
the use of a tributary. Hence, the dissent in Willow River ..9
would seem to make the most sense when it said that Cress
had either been disregarded or overruled.
The real holding in Willow River seems to be a denial of
a right to water for power purposes. Using the ChandlerDunbar decision as precedent, the Court stated that "a strategic position for the development of power does not give rise
to [a] right to maintain it as against interference by the
United States in aid of navigation..".
Whether Section 111 will alter this somewhat inarticulate holding is difficult to say. If the raised water level has
in no manner touched such a power company's land, then it
would be difficult to use Section 111. However, the Supreme
Court indicated that at least some of the Willow River Power
Company's land had been taken. The Court said that "the
water level maintained by the Government in the St. Croix
was approximately three feet above its ordinary high-water
level at claimant's property.. .. But the Court found that the
power company was seeking compensation for a loss of the
drop used in generating power, not for loss of the land. "It is
true that the water level was above high-water mark on the
St. Croix River banks and on claimant's structures, but damage to land as land or to structures as such [was] not shown to
be more than nominal and accounts for no part of the
5
award. '

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2

511.
511-515.
509.
501.

501.
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From all indications, if Section 111 is to change this
case, the claimant would have to rephrase its claim. Instead
of asserting a right in the natural level of the river, it should
seek compensation for loss of use of the land for the production of power. Section 111 would seem to sanction such a
claim. To make the claim legitimate, the claimant would have
to convince the Court that (1) navigable waters are involved;
(2) the claim is for a value in the land, not in water; and (3)
there will be a taking of real property by the Government,
even though there is no divesting of fee ownership. To prove
that navigable waters are involved should not be too difficult
if one keeps in mind that it was the St. Croix and not the
Willow River which inundated the land. To prove the second
element would require that the power company draw a distinction between what is a value in land and what is a value in
the water or, in the alternative, show that Section 111 destroys
any such distinction. Finally, the power company could use
the Cress decision to prove that when Section 111 uses the
word "taken", it does not mean only a taking of the fee
ownership. 5 '
The obvious conflict between the Cress and Willow River
decisions was once again brought to light in United States v.
In that case the land inKansas City Life Insurance Co.'
volved was located some 11/2 miles from the Mississippi River.
The land bordered on a non-navigable tributary of the Mississippi. The Government constructed a lock and dam on the
Mississippi, raising the water in the river and its tributary
to the normal high water mark. The landowner sought compensation for damage to his land, claiming that the raised
water level also raised the subsurface water table to a point
where farming was no longer possible. This time the Court
held that damages to private property not within the bed of a
navigable mainstream were compensable. Therefore, as in
Cress, Section 111 would not be used by a landowner if he
sought to be compensated for all his losses. But, the Govern153. See p. 524 supre.
154. 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
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ment could still argue that Section 111 has overruled Kansas
15 5

City Life.

There is obviously a substantial conflict between the
Kansas City Life case and the decision in Willow River. One
very plausible explanation of the conflict is that the "navigation servitude does not, without more, underlie non-navigable streams, ' .. i.e., Congress must expressly exercise its
authority over a tributary for it to be subject to the navigation servitude. In both Cress and Kansas City Life, there was
no express exercise of authority over the tributary. In Willow River, however, the dominant concern of the Court was
over the raising of the level of water in the navigable mainstream itself. If this distinction should hold true, then the
best results under Section 111 would call for its application
only to Willow River, leaving Cress and Kansas City Life
untouched. 57
III. CONCLUSION

After the above discussion, it is fairly evident that the
navigation servitude's no compensation rule is changed by
Section 111. The extent of that change, however, remains a
mystery. All that can be said with reasonable certainty is that
United States v. Rands is overruled. Any comment beyond
that point involves a certain amount of speculation.
This comment has not attempted to cover all the problems
that might arise under Section 111. The intent has been to
bring out some of the more obvious solutions and questions
created by that law. Definite answers can only be found in
the courts. It is hoped that this comment has furnished some
ideas in providing these answers.
KERRY R. BRITTAIN
155. See pp. 538-39 supra.
156. Morreale, supra note 3, at 47.
157. This is so barring the government's success with the argument that Cress
and Kansas City Life have been overruled by Section 111.
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COMMENTS
APPENDIX A

House of Representatives Bill Number 12383, 91st Congress,
1st Session, June 24, 1969
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America iWCongress assembled. That
when riparian property located on a navigable water of the
United States is acquired by the United States (through negotiation or by condemnation), the price to be paid for the
property shall include any special value which may attach to
the property by reason of its riparian location and for the
purpose of determining such price, the United States shall
not be deemed to own a navigational servitude.
B
House of Representatives Bill Number 17505 and Senate
Bill Number 3815, 91st Congress, 2d Session, May 6, 1970.
APPENDIX

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
section 301 of the Land Acquisition Policy Act of 1960 (33
U.S.C. 596; 74 Stat. 480) is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 301. It is declared to be the policy of Congress that
owners and tenants whose property is acquired for public
works projects of the United States of America shall be
paid a just and reasonable consideration therefore. The just
and reasonable consideration to be paid for property taken by
the United States above the normal high water mark of navigable waters in the United States shall be the fair market
value of such property, including the value of any riparian
use which may exist at the time of taking of such property
or for which such property would be suited with reasonable
probability in the foreseeable future, and disregarding the
exercise of any navigational servitude of the United States
involved in the taking itself or any potential future exercise
of such servitude. In order to facilitate the acquisition of
land and interests therein by negotiation with property
owners, to avoid litigation and to relieve congestion in the
courts, the Secretary of the Army (or such other officers of
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the Department of the Army as he may designate) is authorized in any negotiations for the purchase of such property to
pay a purchase price which will take into consideration the
policy set forth in the section."
APPENDIX C
Senate Bill Number 4572, Section 109, 91st Congress,
2d Session, December 8, 1970
Sec. 109. The Secretary of the Army, acting through
the Chief of Engineers, is authorized, in cooperation with
other Federal agencies and appropriate non-Federal public
and private interests, to undertake a study of the effects of
the navigation servitude of the United States with respect to
(1) landfills and structures in navigable waters of the United
States, and the need for and desirability of providing relief
from such effects; (2) the basis of determining the amount
of compensation to be paid the owners of riparian lands on
navigable waters when acquired by the United States; and
(3) the need for new procedures whereby the navigation
servitude vested in the United States may be waived or otherwise modified in appropriate circumstances, including recommendations as to procedures to effectuate such waiver of
modification giving full regard to the interests of the public
and private property owners. The Secretary shall report to
the Congress the results of such study together with his recommendations not later than two years after the date of the
enactment of the Act.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss2/7

44

